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ABSTRACT 
In this article we assess evidence and test the hypothesis that the complicated 
architecture and processes of national defense planning, programming, budgeting and 
execution and the defense acquisition decision system produce system linkage weaknesses 
that lead to unintended and negative consequences for defense acquisition and 
procurement. The purpose of this article is to identify key points of linkage weakness and 
failure between DOD financial management and acquisition decision systems, and then 
suggest how reengineering and realignment might be approached to resolve some of 
these problems. We first describe the key components of the defense planning, program, 
budgeting and execution system (PPBES) decision process. We then provide an analysis 
of recent changes to PPBES. Next, we describe the defense acquisition system (DAS) in 
detail. Then, relying on independent assessment of system relationships and data 
gathered from interviews with system participants, we identify systems linkages and areas 
of misalignment between the PPBES and the DAS. Finally, we provide conclusions with 
respect to our hypothesis and analysis of consequent key problems and issues to be 
addressed by top level DOD leadership. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this article is to conduct an analysis of how DOD resource management 
and acquisition decisions operate and to identify key points of linkage weakness or 
failure between these systems. We first describe the PPBE system and decision process. 
We then provide an analysis of recent changes to PPBES. Next, we describe the defense 
acquisition system (DAS) in detail. Then, based on independent assessments of system 
relationships and data gathered from interviews with system participants, we identify 
systems linkages and areas of misalignment between the PPBES and the DAS.  Analysis 
of consequent key problems and issues leads us to render conclusions with respect to our 
hypothesis on how DOD budgeting and acquisition decision making might be improved 
through reengineering and realignment.  
 
PROBLEMS WITH DOD BUDGETING AND ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEMS 
On March 7, 2001, in testimony before Congress, Comptroller General David Walker 
testified that the United States Department of Defense was the best in the world in its 
primary mission—that of warfighting; but, in the same testimony, Walker assigned the 
DOD a failing grade in economy and efficiency: “At the same point in time, the 
Department of Defense is a D plus as it relates to economy and efficiency.”  Walker 
continued, “the acquisitions process is fundamentally broken, the contracts process has 
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got problems, and logistics as well” (McCaffery & Jones, 2004, p. 335). The Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) estimated that the Department of Defense (DOD) had spent 
$146 billion in developing and acquiring weapons in 2004. Moreover, the GAO warned 
that, as a result of inefficient systems and practices, the DOD invited a series of troubling 
outcomes: “Weapon systems routinely take much longer to field, cost more to buy, and 
require more support than provided for in investment plans” (GAO, 2005a, p. 68).  GAO 
staff observed: 
For example, programs move forward with unrealistic program cost and schedule 
estimates, lack clearly defined and stable requirements, use immature technologies in 
launching product development, and fail to solidify design and manufacturing processes 
at appropriate junctures in development. As a result, wants are not always distinguished 
from needs, problems often surface late in the development process, and fixes tend to be 
more costly than if caught earlier. (GAO, 2005a, p. 68) 
Defense acquisition has long been beset by problems related to both politics and 
efficiency. Numerous reforms since the 1950s have attempted to improve the acquisition 
process. Recent reforms including more open competition, streamlined acquisition 
procedures, elimination of obsolete regulations and more effective program management 
are some of the substantial changes made in the DOD in the last ten years to improve 
acquisition budgeting and management. Establishing open competition also is a 
significant part of recent acquisition transformation initiatives. Changes in acquisition 
information technology (resulting from the passage of the Clinger-Cohen Act), the use of 
cost as an independent variable as a means of reducing acquisition costs, and spiral 
acquisition practices are other changes expected to yield positive results. 
Congressional and DOD transformation initiatives under Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld have focused on greater reliance on commercial products and processes and 
more timely infusion of new technology into new and existing systems. Commercial 
product usage is implemented with an understanding of the complex set of impacts that 
stem from use of commercial off-the-shelf technology (Oberndorf & Carney, 1998). 
Procurement solicitation requirements are written to include performance measures. If 
military specifications are necessary, waivers must first be obtained. Solicitations for new 
acquisitions that cite military specifications typically encourage bidders to propose 
alternatives. The DOD has made significant progress in disposing of a portion of its huge 
inventory of military specifications and standards through cancellation, consolidation, 
conversion to a guidance handbook, and replacement with performance specifications 
and non-government standards.  
Despite all of this change, the primary criticisms of the acquisition process remain—
that it is too complex, too slow, and too costly (Barr, 2005). In some cases it also may 
produce weapons that are “over-qualified” or irrelevant to the task at hand when they are 
finally put in the field because the threat and warfighting environment have changed 
since acquisition and procurement decisions were made to contract for weapons 
platforms, systems and components. Annual budget cycle procedures and politics within 
the DOD and between the DOD and Congress add complexity, turbulence and some 
degree of confusion to this mix.   
 
THE DEFENSE FINANCIAL RESOURCE DECISION SYSTEM 
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For four decades, the Department of Defense has developed resource plans and budgets 
using the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System, or PPBS. This system integrates 
warfighting requirements, the programming for acquisition of assets including airplanes, 
ships, and tanks, and the specification of annual budget amounts needed to operate the 
Department of Defense. These latter amounts are converted in appropriation categories 
and passed along to Congress in the President’s budget. Various documents, planning 
processes and iterations fulfill the mandates of the system.  
The Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution system (now PPBES—see 
below) is comprised of a series of multistage and multilevel processes that cumulatively 
allow the DOD to determine capability and needs based on strategic doctrine. It provides 
the process for decision making on defense programs required to meet deterrence and 
warfighting demands, and the financing necessary to acquire and sustain capability.  The 
complexities and machinations of the system confound both participants and observers.  
This is due both to the tangled web of overlapping processes that make up the PPBES and 
to the sheer size of the budget in terms of numbers of programs, as well as the amounts of 
money involved. This is compounded by the need to meet a series of deadlines to keep 
the process on schedule to produce a defense budget for the President and Congress. 
Congressional appropriation restrictions also create difficulties in the process because 
Congress provides money differently than the manner in which the DOD budgets 
(McCaffery & Jones, 2004).   
In overview, the PPBES consists of four separate sub-systems: planning, 
programming, budgeting and execution. Program and budget review operate roughly 
simultaneously. Program and budget review are shaped by decisions made by DOD 
senior executives in the Strategic Planning Guidance process (SPG) and by the Senior 
Leaders Review Group (SLRG)—chaired by the Secretary of Defense and including 
major players representing the military and DOD leadership. The Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs and his staff submit input to the PPBES through the Chairman’s Program 
Recommendation, the Joint Planning Guidance (JPG) and the Chairman’s Program 
Assessment. Combatant Commanders give input through their Integrated Priority Lists 
(IPLs), through conferences and lessons learned and through participation on the SLRG. 
The military services have input specifically in building the Program Objectives 
Memorandum or POM directly, and to the budget through their department secretaries 
and service of their senior leaders on the SLRG. The military services also conduct 
numerous special studies, e.g., by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Program and 
Analysis (PA&E) or by the planning and programming offices within the military 
departments and services. The PPBES features myriad individual planning sub-systems 
and decision making sub-processes, involving a large number of participants, the sum of 
which defies complete description as a coherent system. Figure 1 shows the most 
prominent events and their timing in the period of one calendar year in the PPBES 
decision cycle but excludes budget execution that occurs after Congress and the President 
have approved appropriations for the DOD. 
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Figure 1. The PPBES Cycle (Daly, 2004, p. 4) 
 
The purpose of the PPBES is to provide a systematic and structured approach for 
allocating resources in support of the national security strategy of the US.  The ultimate 
goal of the entire PPBES process is to provide the military Commander-in-Chiefs with 
the best mix of forces, equipment and support attainable within resource constraints. 
Before delving into an analysis of the fit between the acquisition system and PPBES, it is 
necessary to understand more about how the changes initiated in 2001 and 2003 result in 
significant reforms authorized by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld under the 
administration of President George W. Bush.  
 
PPBES TRANSFORMATION 
In 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and staff transformed the PPBES decision cycle 
and also added an “E” to PPB to emphasize the importance of budget execution. The new 
PPBE system is part of the transformation of business affairs initiative led by the 
Secretary of Defense in the DOD, and it constitutes a significant initiative to improve and 
correct many of the evident problems that have weighed-down the functioning of the 
PPBS for decades. First, the change to the PPBES merged separate program and budget 
review processes into a single review cycle performed concurrently rather than 
sequentially. Second, it incorporated a budget process matched to the presidential 
electoral cycle, with major strategic changes slated for the second and fourth years of a 
Presidential term and minimal updating of plans and programs in the first and third years, 
given no major change in the threat. Third, it fixed timing of the process so that planning 
and budgeting were clearly derivative processes driven by the Quadrennial Defense 
Review and the National Military Strategy. Fourth, it changed the cycle for Office of the 
Secretary of Defense provision of top-level planning information to the military 
departments and services from an annual to a multi-year schedule with the combined 
program and budget review. The essence of the PPBES transformation is establishment 
of a four-year resource planning and decision cycle. 
What transformation of the PPBES allows is that in a four-year Presidential 
administration, fundamental change is targeted for the second year of the cycle with the 
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first and third years changed only as threat environment demands increased modification.  
Given a stable environment, year two would result in the most fundamental analysis and 
change in plans, programs and budgets. Whether the defense environment is stable 
enough to support a four-year decision system remains to be seen. We now move to 
address this and other questions with respect to the consequences of recent PPBES 
transformation.  
As noted, PPBES changes have created a combined two-year program and budget-
review decision cycle (but not a biennial budget), with a complete review in year one, 
followed by limited incremental review in year two. This change in cycle from a full-
program review and a full-budget review to a combined review is meant to reduce the 
inefficiencies of unnecessary re-making of program decisions; the program should drive 
the budget rather than the opposite. With the programming and budgeting cycles 
operating contemporaneously, decisions are intended to be arrived at more effectively, 
whether they are made in the off- or on-year. Changes made in each off-year cycle are 
intended to have quicker effect by compressing the programming and budgeting cycles 
while still preserving the decisions made in the on-year cycle through the off-year by 
limiting reconsideration of decisions to only the most necessary updates. In essence, 
decisions flow from the Quadrennial Defense Review and other studies; then, a structure 
is erected in the Strategic and Joint Planning Guidances that provides direction for the 
remaining years of a Presidential term. This structure remains in place unless dramatic 
changes in worldwide threat occur. Year-to-year changes in the program structure and 
budget then are made only to adjust to incremental fact-of-life changes. The 
inefficiencies of conducting comprehensive reviews every year (as intended in the 
previous PPBS process) are avoided, and the decision process itself supposedly moves 
more responsively to warfighting and preparation demands.  
Also, this new process puts the Secretary of Defense into the decision environment at 
an earlier stage than in the old PPB process; it puts him “in the driver’s seat,” in the 
words of one budgeteer. Decisions in the new PPBES are intended to reach the Secretary 
while options are still open, and while important and large-scale changes still can be 
proposed—before the final decision has become a foregone conclusion at the military 
department level. When the Defense Secretary’s input came at the end of the stream of 
decisions, some changes that could have been made were pre-empted because they would 
have caused too much “breakage” in other programs. 
 
DECISION SYSTEMS FOR ACQUISITION 
The architecture of the PPBES interacts with two other major systems for acquisition 
planning, decision making and execution. These two systems are (1) the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) that is employed for 
determining warfighting requirements, and (2) the Defense Acquisition System (DAS), a 
system used for planning, decision and execution for research and development, test and 
evaluation and then procurement of capital assets. 
These three systems -- PPBES, JCIDS and the DAS -- comprise the core of the DOD 
financial resource and acquisition decision making, allocation and execution process. Let 
us examine the JCIDS and the DAS more closely. 
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Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
The Joint Capabilities System (JCIDS) has replaced what used to be known as the 
Requirements Generation System (RGS). Through the JCIDS, defense decision makers 
apply the prevailing precepts of national and defense strategy to create joint fighting 
forces capable of performing the military operations required by the nature of the threat 
faced by US armed forces—something that is constantly changing. The JCIDS process is 
shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The JCIDS Process (From Bowman, 2003) 
 
 
The JCIDS was developed to identify joint warfighting requirements and to 
emphasize a top-down orientation to decision making.  Instead of the former process—in 
which military departments and services determined mission requirements and identified 
joint needs to increase program funding attractiveness as they prepared and routed their 
acquisition program proposals up the chain of command—in JCIDS, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) first determines if the required capability exists, then pushes 
it down to the resource sponsor in the military departments and services for acquisition.  
If jointness in acquisition and procurement is required, then the program is essentially 
“born joint." In addition, the term “capabilities-based” is a recent refinement of guidance 
for the entire purpose of the acquisition decision system.  In the JCIDS, gaps in 
warfighting capability, either current or those programmed in the Future Years Defense 
Plan (FYDP), are identified—and any risks associated with gaps are quantified.  JCIDS 
decision makers then determine future capabilities to address existing gaps.  In doing so, 
it is important that the decision makers be specific enough about a new capability to 
include key attributes with appropriate measures of effectiveness, supportability, time, 
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distance, effect (including scale) and obstacles to be overcome. Additionally, the 
capability needs be general enough not to prejudice decisions in favor of a particular 
means of implementation.   
The Defense Acquisition System 
Whereas top level DOD decision makers use the JCIDS to identify capability 
requirements as current and future threat scenarios emerge, the Defense Acquisition 
System (DAS) evaluates JCIDS-defined capability gaps, and initiates and executes 
acquisition and procurement programs to field systems to bridge these gaps. In situations 
where the technology exists to fill a requirement, the DAS exists to acquire a tailored and 
capable product quickly and in a cost-efficient manner. When new technology is required 
to fill a capability gap, it is through the DAS that the DOD develops, tests, demonstrates 
and deploys the new technology in a timely manner and at a fair and reasonable price. In 
either case, the DAS is forward-looking and tries to ensure that systems fielded support 
not only today’s fighting forces, but also those of the future. 
The DAS exists in a highly dynamic and political environment. Since defense 
acquisition in aggregate involves billions of dollars each year, the process, participants 
and individual programs are linked to powerful stakeholders. These include the executive 
branch of the federal government with the DOD acting as its agent, the legislative branch 
where the Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations committees decide what 
assets will be acquired and funded, private industry where large defense contractors 
compete for business, market share, and product continuity, in which the subcontractors 
and small businesses seek a piece of the business, and state and local governments where 
the defense industrial base is located, where the workforce lives, where dollars are spent 
and taxes are collected. These stakeholders are both supportive in seeking dollars for 
defense acquisition and rivals for business. This is true not only in the private sector, but 
between the military departments and the DOD, the military departments and each other, 
and within the military departments as potential programs compete for approval and 
budget.  
Since the DOD determines DAS policies and procedures, negotiates each annual 
budget, makes decisions regarding acquisition programs and the awarding of lucrative 
contracts to private industry, each major player in the process with authority may attempt 
to exert influence in the DAS, be it for efficiency reasons, career or organizational 
ambition or relative to other sources of motivation.  Ultimately, Congress holds the 
power of the purse and must balance defense and non-defense spending.  Nonetheless, all 
these stakeholders compete for some sort of corporate, organizational and professional 
gain. DOD acquisition is performed in the highly competitive, but only partially 
transparent, environment of the nation’s capitol. 
To do their jobs well, those who manage projects within the DOD must understand 
the political, social and economic aspects and consequences of the defense acquisition 
process.  From the lowest echelons of program management to the top, the Under-
secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD, AT&L)), all DOD 
participants must be both knowledgeable and sensitive to the competing forces and 
attempt to craft each program and project so that, ultimately, warfighters are provided the 
best assets to support national security policy. The key stages or milestone points of the 
DAS process move from requirements setting and concept design to determine weapon 
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system needs by the end users -- the fighting forces --through technology and systems 
development to production (procurement) and deployment to warfighters, and, finally, to 
post-deployment operations and support. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 3. The Defense Acquisition System: Major Phases/Milestones 
From DOD, 2003, DODD  
 
According to the DOD Directive 5000.1 (12 May 2003), Defense Acquisition is, “the 
management process by which the Department of Defense provides effective, affordable 
and timely systems to users” (DODD 5000.1, 2003. p. 2).   Decision makers use JCIDS to 
identify capability requirements as the current and future threat dictates. When new 
technology is required to fill a capability gap, it is through the DAS that DOD develops, 
tests, demonstrates and deploys the new technology, “in a timely manner, and at a fair 
and reasonable price” 5000.1, 2003, p. 2). Just as the PPB system is undergoing 
transformational change, so is the defense acquisition system. 
 
ACQUISITION SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION 
In late 2002, the Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz canceled the existing set of 
DOD 5000 series acquisition regulations. In his memorandum, he explained that the 
acquisition system as defined by these regulations was not flexible, creative or efficient 
enough to meet the needs of the DOD. Therefore, he ordered a revision of the acquisition 
process and a reissue of the directives to, “rapidly deliver affordable, sustainable 
capability to the warfighter that meets the warfighter’s needs.” (Wolfowitz, 2003, p. 1). 
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The DAS process breaks the project lifecycle into three general stages: presystems 
acquisition, systems acquisition, and sustainment. These three stages are further divided 
into five distinct sub-phases: Concept Refinement (CR), Technology Development (TD), 
System Development and Demonstration (SDD), Production and Deployment (P&D), 
and Operations and Support (O&S), as shown in Figure 3. These processes guide a 
program from initial exploration of required capability (as detailed in an Initial 
Capabilities Document (ICD)), to the production and deployment of a technologically 
mature weapons system, including required operational support.  
Additionally, each program has a distinct chain of command through which decisions 
are made. Depending on the size and visibility of a particular program, there may be up to 
four levels in the chain of command before the ultimate decision is made by the 
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). Complex programs are sometimes divided into 
smaller elements and assigned groups of acquisition professionals across a range of 
functional disciplines. These groups are called Integrated Process Teams (IPTs). Some 
serve as executors of their respective functional program area. Others serve as advisory 
bodies. 
The Program Manager is at the bottom of the chain of command. According to the 
new DODD 5000.1, the PM, a middle-range military or defense civilian (O-5/O-6) is the 
individual with responsibility for and authority to accomplish program objectives for 
development, production, and sustainment to include “credible cost, schedule, and 
performance reporting to the MDA” (DAU 2003, p. 2). The PM reports to a Program 
Executive Officer (PEO). The PEO, a one- or two-star flag officer or senior executive 
service (SES) equivalent, is responsible for a group of like programs within each military 
department and service. PEOs report to Component Acquisition Executives (CAEs). Each 
service has one CAE responsible for the management direction of their respective 
procurement system. The Secretary of the Navy has delegated this position to the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research Development and Acquisition (ASN 
(RDA)). Finally, the CAE reports to the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE). The 
DOD has only one DAE, the Under-Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics (USD (AT&L)). The USD (AT&L) is authorized under title 10, US Code to 
be, “the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of 
Defense for all matters relating to the DOD acquisition system; research and 
development; advanced technology; developmental test and evaluation; production; 
logistics; etc.”  Also, as the DAE, he presides over the military department and service 
secretaries and, “is responsible for establishing acquisition policies and procedures for the 
Department. He also chairs the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), and makes milestone 
decisions on Acquisition Category (ACAT) ID programs” (DAU 2003, p. 31). Programs 
are categorized by whether they are a DOD-wide asset or an asset for one service and by 
estimated dollars to be expended, with different rules applying to different-sized 
programs. 
The Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), i.e., overall responsibility for all 
programs, may be delegated to anyone in this chain of command. The MDA for many 
small programs is the PM, whereas MDA for the large procurement programs and the 
most politically sensitive programs is usually held at the top by the USD (AT&L). 
In the DAS decision process, program movement through the three DAS stages is 
strictly controlled through a series of six decision points and program reviews. The first 
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stage of the DAS is pre-systems acquisition. Pre-systems acquisition activities are 
focused on refining material solutions to needs as defined in a published Initial 
Capabilities Document (ICD). This stage is split into two phases: Concept Resolution and 
Technological Development. As the first phase concludes, and the second major decision 
point (Milestone A) is reached when the MDA approves both the preferred solution 
supported by the AoA and the TDS. 
Once Milestone A is achieved, the Technology Development stage begins. With the 
exception of some high-dollar shipbuilding programs, an official acquisition program has 
still not considered to have been initiated at this point. Therefore, funding is restricted to 
work that is done in this phase, the intent of which is to, “reduce technology risk and to 
determine the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system” (DAU 
2003, p. 6). This stage is iterative in that the technologies to be refined are continuously 
developed and processed through close interaction between the S&T community, the 
users and the developers. As such, the TDS is constantly reviewed and updated with each 
incremental effort as the technology demonstrations gradually show the proposed 
solution to be, “affordable, militarily useful, and based on mature technology” (DAU 
2003, p. 6).  
The TD phase ends when either the MDA decides to terminate the effort, or the third 
major decision point (Milestone B) is achieved. To be granted Milestone B approval, the 
second major JCIDS analysis (the Capability Development Document (CDD)) must be 
approved through the JCIDS process, and the MDA must approve both the acquisition 
strategy and the acquisition program baseline. The MDA must be satisfied that an 
affordable increment of militarily useful capability has been identified, the technology for 
that increment has been demonstrated in a relevant environment, and development and 
production of a system can be achieved within a relatively acceptable timeframe 
(normally less than five years).  With an ICD providing the context, and an approved 
CDD describing specific program requirements, Milestone B approval is achieved, 
signaling the availability of sufficient technology maturity. When funding is approved by 
Congress and apportioned from the DOD -- critical steps -- then a formal acquisition 
program is born and moves forward in the DAS process. 
If a program is to be executed in increments or spirals through an evolutionary 
acquisition process, each increment will be its own program from the Development and 
Demonstration phase forward. Each increment or spiral must have its own Milestone B 
and C approval. Additionally, increment-specific KPPs must be delineated in the CDD 
for each increment or spiral. Finally, before beginning this phase, and with the current 
increment TDS as a basis, the program manager must build and the MDA must approve 
an acquisition strategy for follow-on increments. Solutions to capability needs can come 
from a variety of sources, including COTS as well as previously discovered mature 
technologies that heretofore had no obvious DOD application. As such, not all acquisition 
efforts need start in CR. Some programs can enter the DAS at later stages; the System 
Development and Demonstration (SDD) stage marks the first point at which a more 
mature technology with an approved ICD and CDD may enter the DAS for further 
refinement without undergoing the scrutiny of CR or TD. 
System Development and Demonstration (SDD) has two main purposes: system 
integration and system demonstration. Systems integration involves integration of both 
mature technologies and component subsystems into one complete design that meets the 
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stated requirement. Additionally, at this point, design detail should be achieved as well as 
tradeoffs considered between risk and technology maturity. Risk is defined as how much 
less capability is allowable while still providing the warfighter with a system that meets 
the intent of the ICD. Thus, decisions must be made to ascertain what is necessary and 
what is achievable based on the maturity of the technologies involved. During this stage, 
such risk decisions must be objectively determined by the program decision makers to 
limit program costs and the overall time required for systems development. 
Systems integration is considered complete when a working prototype has been 
designed, tested, and documented as functional in an environment appropriate to that in 
which the user will employ it. Another decision, the design readiness review (DRR), must 
be successfully negotiated to move to the next part of SDD: systems development. The 
DRR is a mid-phase assessment of the design to document the complete system in terms 
of the percentage of drawings completed; planned corrective actions to 
hardware/software deficiencies; adequate development testing; an assessment of 
environment, safety and occupational health risks; a completed failure modes and effects 
analysis; the identification of key system characteristics and critical manufacturing 
processes; an estimate of system reliability based on demonstrated reliability rates; etc. 
(DAU 2003, p. 8) This phase is complete when both the whole system is verified as 
useful and capable, and the appropriate industrial capability exists to allow the program 
to move on to the next phase, production and deployment (P&D). Additionally, to gain 
Milestone C approval, the MDA needs to be satisfied that the program is ready to be 
committed to production. Otherwise, the MDA must terminate the program. Finally, the 
CPD must be obtained through the JCIDS process. This step declares that the 
performance required to exit the SDD phase and the forecasted production capability 
required to successfully accomplish the P&D phase are in place. 
The objective of the fourth phase of acquisition, P&D, is to establish the full 
operational capability of the program, the ability to produce it in an optimal manner and 
to ensure that the final system meets original JCIDS intent as stated in the ICD. P&D 
begins with Milestone C approval that commits the DOD to production of the program. 
As such, it authorizes the program to enter either low-rate initial production (LRIP) for 
large programs that require this approach, full production for smaller programs that do 
not, or limited deployment and test for information systems that are software intensive.  
There are two aspects to P&D. The first is operational test and evaluation (OT&E), 
including both initial (IOT&E) and follow-on (FOT&E). The test products used come 
from the production line (either LRIP or otherwise as applicable) and the Director, 
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) -- for those products requiring DOT&E 
oversight -- or the appropriate Operational Test Agency (OTA) determines the number of 
production-line units required for the testing regimen. The other aspect to the P&D phase 
is the ability of the established production line to handle the job of producing the required 
units at the rate required by contract. For large-scale production efforts, LRIP is required 
to ensure adequate and efficient manufacturing capability, to produce the minimum 
quantity necessary to provide units for IOT&E, to establish an initial production base for 
the system, and to permit an orderly increase in the production rate for the system 
(sufficient to lead to full-rate production upon successful testing) (DAU 2003, p. 9). 
For programs requiring Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP), the final decision 
analysis, provided in the Full Rate Production (FRP) Decision Review, is required before 
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moving into full-speed production. This decision is made by the MDA after consideration 
of, “initial operational test and evaluation and live fire test and evaluation results (if 
applicable); demonstrated interoperability; supportability; cost and manpower estimates; 
and command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence supportability and 
certification (if applicable)” (DAU 2003, p. 56).  
Finally, as the first production units are delivered to the user, the O&S phase begins. 
There is an overlap in the last two phases, and the PM must maintain oversight of both. 
O&S has two distinct parts: sustainment and disposal. Logistics and readiness matters at 
this point include maintenance, transportation, manpower, personnel, training, safety, 
survivability, etc.; these matters are a primary focus of the PM during sustainment. There 
are a number of post-design and production factors, such as the fleet logistics capability 
for the Navy for example, that must be addressed and tested during this phase before 
ascertaining the supportability of the program through established channels, be they 
military or commercial. Assets also are tested for efficiency to determine system ability 
to effectively provide support to the user in the most cost-efficient manner to achieve the 
lowest possible lifecycle cost and, to the extent possible, total ownership cost. Since 
many programs stay in the field for years, even decades, the PM must work with the user 
to document the O&S requirements to continuously evaluate the lifecycle costs, making 
improvements or service life extensions as necessary in attempt to control and contain 
total ownership costs. 
The last phase of the DAS, disposal, is focused on meeting the costs associated with 
the end of the useful life of an asset. Throughout the design process, the PM must detail 
hazards that will affect end-of-life costs and must estimate and plan for eventual disposal 
costs. When the system finally reaches the end of its useful life, the PM is responsible for 
ushering it through the process of demilitarization and disposal, “in accordance with all 
legal and regulatory requirements and policy relating to safety (including explosives 
safety), security, and the environment” (DAU 2003, p. 11).  
In summary, from the description above it is clear that the DAS is a highly complex, 
protracted decision process and management control system, which explains in part why 
it takes so long to acquire new defense assets. Could this process be reduced in terms of 
complexity, number of decision steps, players, and decision cycle-time through process 
reengineering? This is a question tangential to the thrust of this paper, but one that 
deserves further attention. 
 
LINKAGES BETWEEN DECISION SYSTEMS 
The JCIDS and the DAS systems are tied to each other a number of different ways.  The 
primary goal of the DAS is to acquire capabilities for the DOD as directed through the 
Joint Chiefs. This relationship is carried out formally through the four formal JCIDS 
documents as well as through the many required DAS program reviews. They are also 
informally linked through the leaders of each process, some of whom have multiple roles 
to play in both. 
As noted, the JCIDS documents include the Initial Capabilities Documents (ICDs), 
Capability Development Documents (CDDs), Capability Production Documents (CPDs) 
and the Capstone Requirements Documents (CRDs). These are directly and formally 
linked to DAS events. They are governed by policy and regulation and provide critical 
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information to DAS leaders with respect to critical program elements like performance 
criteria, program size, impacts and constraints. They also help specify the level of 
administrative oversight required. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Source: (DODI 5000.2, 2003, p. 3). Note: Circles indicate linkage zones 
between the JCIDS and the DAS.  
 
 
Generally, different JCIDS documents are required before each DAS milestone 
review; also, DAS players have to submit documents to JCIDS players for approval 
before a program can proceed past a milestone; for example, before milestone B 
approval, “the CDD must be received from the JCIDS leadership. For the JCIDS 
decision-makers to approve the CDD, they must receive data from the DAS 
representatives and review the progress of the program” (Fierstine, 2004, p. 55). This 
represents a formal relationship where documents are passed back and forth between 
players in these two systems, with one set providing data and the other approving it 
before the first may give milestone approval. Notice in the schematic how each of the 
milestone decision points (MS A, MS B, MS C) is accompanied by input from the JCIDS 
via JROC and DAS via DAB. 
Additional critical formal links are created between the two systems when the same 
players hold important positions in both systems. First among these is the Secretary of 
Defense and his staff, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Undersecretary for 
Acquisition, Transportation and Logistics, and Assistant Secretaries including the DOD 
Comptroller and Chief Financial Officer, and the Secretary for Planning, Analysis and 
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Evaluation. The USD (AT&L) is central to this process as he chairs the DAB and 
Milestone Decision Authority for all the large procurement programs. He also has the 
authority to ask the JROC to review a program at any time. This gives him a powerful 
hand in both the JCIDS and DAS processes. The Deputy Secretary of Defense chairs the 
Senior Leaders Group (SLRG), in which all the important decisions are made which 
involve both JCIDS and DAS items. Various Under and Assistant Secretaries of Defense 
serve on the SLRG, the DAB, and Functional Capabilities Boards. Probably the most 
important of these is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information 
Integration (ASD (NII)) who serves on the DAB, the SLRG and the FCBs.  
On the military side of the house, the most important link is probably the Vice 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (VCJCS) who functions as chairman of the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and is Vice Chair of both the Senior Leader 
Review Group (SLRG) and the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). Staff organizations 
within the Joint Staff apparatus also are important. These include the offices of J-8 (the 
Joint Potential Designator (JPD) Gatekeeper), J-7, (the executive agent for 
transformation), and J-6 (the agent who ensures IT/NSS interoperability and provides 
review, coordination and certification functions in support of the JCIDS and DAS) 
(CJCS, 2004, 3170.01D, p. B-4).  
Within the military departments, the vice chiefs of each service sit on the JROC and 
the service secretaries sit on both the DAB and the SLRG. It should be remembered that 
individual military personnel form the lion’s share of representation on oversight and 
analysis bodies related to both processes.  Also, the Services are the sponsors for every 
program and research effort, and they staff the program offices.  Furthermore, the 
Services run the JCIDS analysis processes. 
Since the JCIDS and the DAS are event-driven systems, they follow similar patterns 
and are linked through their programs and documentation. In contrast, the PPBES is a 
calendar-driven sequence of events. JCIDS or DAS events may or may not fit neatly in 
the POM/budget cycle. DAS events may or may not fit neatly into the off-year or on-year 
cycle. For example, when a major program gets a “go” signal in an off-year, what this 
does to the basic concept of off-year is yet to be determined. It hardly seems like the 
program will be told to wait until next year, but if resources then are committed, does this 
mean that decision space is pre-empted from the following on- year? Does this mean the 
on-year becomes an off-year? What if the “go” signal occurs in the first year of a 
Presidential regime? Will this mean a wait? If it is a major capacity-enhancing 
acquisition, what will this mean for the QDR scheduled to arrive some 12 months later? 
Will strategy and doctrinal changes be pre-empted? What if a large program appears 
about to fail a major milestone, but it has been counted on as a part of a Presidential 
legacy in the fourth year of a Presidency: will the program be”forced” and the assumption 
made that it will get well (that its difficulty will be corrected) in the off-years (e.g., the 
USMC V-22 Osprey aircraft)? These decisions have consequences for each other, just as 
the battlefield concept in the late 1990s when the decision about armoring Humvees was 
made; doctrine appears to have envisioned a front-line/rear-area split with little need to 
armor Humvees because only a few would be used in or near the front line. Iraq did not 
turn out that way, hence the scramble to uparmor Humvees.  
The point is that any procurement effort can span multiple annual PPBES cycles, be 
under the influence of a series of layered PPBES decisions and feed data back into any 
  
International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 6     Issue 2  ·   2005  ·  © International Public Management Network 
101  
 
number of current and future PPBES phases. The link to the PPBES formally comes from 
the Strategic Planning Council (SPC) which develops the Strategic Planning Guidance 
(SPG).  The SPC is led by SECDEF and made up of the Senior Leaders Review Group 
(SLRG) and the Combatant Commanders; it includes virtually all of the senior leadership 
in the DOD, civilian and military, including 19 four-star billets, the service secretaries 
and various OSD-level representatives. This group produces the Strategic Planning 
Guidance, although it probably would be most correct to say that it is produced for 
SECDEF, belongs to him, and that his views are dominant in the end product. The SPG 
sets the scene for the POM-budget process, feeding directly into the POM. It identifies 
and sets up DOD-wide trade-offs and identifies joint needs, excesses and gaps; it focuses 
on such things as threat changes, war-plans analysis, new concepts, and lessons learned.  
For example, one lesson learned might be that US forces may have to be prepared to 
fight in both traditional and non-traditional battlefields (e.g., Iraq); this lesson has 
significant consequences for both doctrine and attributes of warfighting platforms. If 
Humvees are going to be at risk of taking direct and high-powered fire wherever they go 
(in a front-line is everywhere GWOT scenario), then their armor needs change. The POM 
process is also informed by issues surfaced by the Combatant Commanders (COCOMS) 
routed through an extended planning process to the joint staff. The result of this input of 
information is the Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR) and the Joint Planning 
Guidance (JPG), which help integrate joint capabilities into the POM process. The link 
between the DAS and PPBES is that the JCIDS’s capabilities analysis model is used to 
examine current and forecasted capability needs.   
At the service level, a number of other interactions exist. In the Department of the 
Navy, for example, during the POM and budget build/review processes, the Navy 
requirements officers and analysts under N7 and the Financial Managers and analysts 
under N8 independently conduct their own campaigns, scenario and program analyses.  
In doing so, they use the same scenarios, simulations and models as are used in the 
JCIDS by OSD, the joint staff and the rest of the MILDEPS.  Additionally, all the data 
regarding past, current and future program cost comes from the program offices who 
manage the Services’ acquisition programs.   
At the most basic level, the PPBE system and the Defense Acquisition system are 
linked through program cost data.  Program offices build OSIPs (Operational Safety 
Improvement Programs); these are used to create the budget line items that detail 
program cost data and to feed that data through their budget offices for their programs 
(BFMs) to the Navy Budget office (FMB); here, it is used during program-cost analysis 
throughout the year.  When the Navy Budget Office asks questions about a program or 
recommends changes, those are answered or completed based on the data provided in 
these OSIPs.  These questions may happen during the budgeting phase, when marks and 
reclamas (appeals of budget cuts) are made, or during budget execution.  The analysts in 
N7, who represent the warfare requirements community, and the analysts in N8, who are 
the budgeters and linked to the PPBE, closely monitor the acquisition programs. In the 
current year, if a program is under-executing, then the program and budget analysts will 
make adjustments as necessary to ensure that money is diverted to those programs that 
will spend it by the end of the appropriation period. 
The result is that the warfighting-needs system, the acquisition system (DAS), and the 
PPBE system focus around various points of integration and articulation -- from an 
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assessment of the threat in the SPG to a design for joint capabilities in the JPG through 
the POM building process and into the annual budget preparation and review processes. 
While formal documents provide for co-ordination, some co-ordination happens by 
forcing decisions on different aspects of defense needs through the same sets of players. 
Formal documents are required and reviewed by these players before decisions are made 
initially and at subsequent important check points, be they milestones, POM, or budget 
decisions. Additionally, staffs of analysts in different organizational locales have 
responsibilities for data production and review in program creation, implementation, and 
execution. They tend to be focused on a single-issue -- on, for example, the best weapon 
system, or the most weapon systems for the money available this year. These players 
assume coordination and integration is done at levels above them or prior to program 
starts, or whenever the POM is built and reviewed, or whenever the threat changes or 
when new capabilities are needed or old capabilities may be foregone, or even when a 
strike in a tin mine in South America may imperil the pace of a program.  
There is no doubt but that this is a complicated arrangement. Perhaps the single most 
confounding factor in these equations is time. Weapon systems take time to develop and 
build. The V-22 for the Marine Corps has been in development of one sort or another 
since the late 1980s, the Navy LPD-17 since 1998. The engineering and deploying of the 
surveillance drone in Afghanistan in 18 months is the exception to the rule. Most 
weapons acquisition programs take years to develop. The procurement effort can span 
multiple annual PPBES cycles, be under the influence of a series of layered PPBES 
decisions and feed data back into a number of current and future PPBES phases. 
What this means is that when complicated programs (all weapons programs are 
complicated) are conceived and developed, they move through the multi-phase PPBES 
process. What this means in practice is that they also are reviewed by different 
individuals. Turnover in personnel in the DOD is high. This happens by law and practice 
for military leaders; the effect is that turnover happens every two to three years. This 
level of turnover is just as true on the civilian side. Thus, the Marine V-22 program has 
seen six different Secretaries of Defense. It was begun under Secretary of Defense Caspar 
Weinberger and continued under Secretaries Dick Cheney, Les Aspin, William Perry, 
William Cohen, and Donald Rumsfeld. In fact, the average tenure of senior leadership in 
the DOD is 1.7 years. Thus, co-ordination by position is riskier than it seems. If the 
distance between milestones A and B or B and C is more than two years, it is highly 
likely that most of the players in the SLRG will have changed. Even when they are the 
same people, they may be sitting in new positions and have changed the interests they 
represent. This is true for both civilian and military leaders. The result is that one should 
not count on the effectiveness of coordination by position. This leaves coordination by 
document as the fall-back position. Fiscal climate is also a complicating factor. Weapons 
systems that take years to develop and field will go thru varying fiscal climates: for 
example, the Marine Corps V-22 aircraft started in a rich procurement environment in the 
mid-1980s and was kept alive in the procurement holiday in the 1990s. Change also 
comes from change in the threat situation or battlefield doctrine: Secretary Rumsfeld’s 
goal of transforming the Army to a lighter, agile, and more lethal organization doomed 
the Crusader artillery system. Another aspect of this happens when a service can not 
decide on the capabilities it wants and, thus, decides to maximize all capabilities; this is 
roughly what happened to Navy air plans in the early 1990s. The result was a years-long 
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delay for plans for new aircraft. Thus, the passage of time means that people, resources, 
and doctrine change. These are all threats to the orderly integration of the warfighting 
requirements, DAS and PPBES.  
 
ASSESSING PROBLEMS WITH PPBES AND DAS ALIGNMENT 
In the research project that produced this paper, interviews were conducted in the 
Pentagon environment on the topic of the degree of fit between PPBES and Acquisition 
decision systems. A number of current and past DOD process players in and around the 
Beltway were interviewed, including some now working in the private sector doing 
business with the DOD. Those interviewed in this project included representatives of 
Navy contractors, representatives from Navy air and sea system commands, Washington-
based Navy resource management officials, OSD acquisition officials and active and 
retired JCS officials. Interviews were supplemented by discussions and briefings by high-
level military officials in the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) and the 
Joint Chiefs’ staff (J-8).  
We make no claim that our interview findings are definitive, but they provide insight 
into potential (perceived as real) dysfunctions within and between the PPBES and DAS 
analysis and decision processes.  First, interviewees voiced concern with what we may 
term political issues: that all levels of the chain of command produce budget estimates 
that are above guidance, that the political sensitivity of large weapons programs affects 
requirements analysis and resource decisions, and that many decision makers use political 
clout to stave off directives from higher authority. Secondly, they criticized process: that 
a small number of people in the processes have disproportionate influence, that decisions 
are adversely affected by time compression—compounded by the lack of sufficient 
information—and that decisions are adversely impacted by the existence of too many 
approval levels in the acquisition chain of command.  Thirdly, they focused on 
management and cost issues: that there is excessive duplication within and between the 
PPBES and DAS processes at all levels; that repetitious calculation of program costs in 
response to program and budget “drills” has an adverse effect on motivation, and that 
absence of clarity and consensus on costs causes significant difficulty in execution when 
budgeted funds are lower than required.  Insofar as transformation is concerned, they 
reported that concurrent program and budget review in the new PPBES process has 
caused a significant increase in workload without a significant increase in benefits; they 
felt that transformation has not resolved the issue of communicating appropriate 
information to decision makers, and transformational change actually has slowed down 
many stages of the review and decision processes.  They identified barriers to change to 
include: (a) emergent user needs  not addressed adequately; (b)  an over-reliance on 
correct verbiage in the OSIPs; (c) ill-defined and cumbersome blanket joint requirements,  
(d) inequitable  distribution of common funds; (e) innovation hindered by the type of 
rigid control exercised over multiyear procurements constrains program flexibility; (f) 
with regard to program documentation, required process forms and “semantics” 
sometimes confuses intent; (g) budgetary constraints that drive changes in schedule 
and/or performance requirements that, in turn, have an unintended and negative impact 
on cost control.   
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Some interview respondents thought that, as budgets “moved up” the organizational 
hierarchy, there was a tendency to overestimate dollars to get the correct amount of 
warfighting capability; they believed this resulted in budgets exceeding guidance.  Some 
respondents also felt that the large and expensive weapons systems which were built in 
several congressional districts or states were, perhaps, not subjected to as searching a 
warfare analysis scrutiny as they should have been. Respondents were concerned that, 
“…leadership can and does direct funding for programs deemed important, yet not 
supported by the analysis, given the info available to mid-level experts” (Fierstine, 2004, 
p. 99). They also said the lack of time and insufficient data or expertise impacted the 
quality of the budget decisions that were made. Respondents also worried about the 
degree of overlap and churn in the system. We speculate further on this below.  
The military departments and services, the joint staff and OSD all do very similar 
analyses using the same data, models and simulations. All of this adds time and 
manpower effort to the process without necessarily reducing the necessity for guesswork 
and intuition. With respect to transformation, respondents felt that the PPBES was still a 
work in progress and had not produced a significant increase in benefits. We would 
observe the primary difficulty here is that the budgeters begin to work on the budget 
before a POM package has been completed.  Further, in the budget and programming 
process, people routinely make decisions without a full grasp of all the facts and data. 
This was evident at all levels, from those in the program and requirements offices who 
had to route paperwork through people unfamiliar with their platform, to those in FMB 
making spot judgments due to time constraints. Finally, everyone interviewed 
complained about the length of time it takes to route paperwork and receive decisions. 
Respondents also worried that emergent needs were not identified and integrated into 
the system soon enough—in effect, that joint needs had priority, and some programs were 
identified as joint and given priority when the likelihood of their being used in a joint 
environment was low. They also criticized the cumbersome procedures necessary to gain 
approval in the JCS review process. Some of those interviewed expressed the view that 
some program and requirements officer emergent needs for existing programs are not 
adequately addressed in the current system. Most argued that a big part of the current 
problem is the fact that the comptrollers are tied to the exact terminology in the OSIPs; 
therefore, anything not specifically delineated in the OSIPs has to endure the lengthy 
delay of a new program start-up. They all complained about the difficulty of navigating 
through the vague joint requirements required of all communication gear; these 
requirements force them to route all associated programs and upgrades through numerous 
joint wickets, even though many of the programs would not be used in such a manner as 
to require the joint standard. Finally, a few interviewees took issue with the equitable 
distribution of funds in programs that took money from everyone in order to provide 
commonality to all platforms. They claimed that these funds were effectively an under-
the-table system for certain systems to get their capability funded by everyone else.  
Those interviewed explained that playing the game carefully is important. One 
interviewee had a list of the correct words to use when writing justification for dollars in 
different appropriations. Although a number of terms were virtually synonymous and 
would appear to mean approximately the same thing, a word that was wrong for the 
account could lead to a turndown or a do-over. For example, a careful analyst would use 
the terms “investigate or research” when writing justification for an RDT&E account, but 
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use the terms “analyze or assess” when doing the same activity for an APN justification. 
And an O&M request using these words would be looked upon unfavorably. The word 
“track” is probably as close as the O&M accounts get to in depth analysis.  
Respondents were concerned with innovative adaptations to organizational stress. 
Here we point out how requirements change (downward) as programs fail to meet 
requirements; we will illustrate how Program Managers have found that if they can move 
their programs to a multi-year profile, they can fend off much of the churn that is driven 
by the annual budget process, particularly one that takes place in an era of scarce 
resources. Programmers have begun to increasingly use multi-year procurement strategies 
in an attempt to fence off programs from the annual churn that is inevitable. For example, 
breaking a MYP contract is a tremendously powerful argument to ward off a cut. The 
programmers also have used BTRs (Below Threshold Reprogramming) to their 
advantage to protect their accounts from raids during execution. This has the added 
benefit of cushioning them against the end of the year need to spend their money or lose 
it by designating a recipient for unspent funds and then possibly getting reciprocation 
from that recipient after the new budget comes along.  
Reflecting on the above research, we observe that the most significant issue 
discovered is that an overwhelming amount of redundancy exists at all levels of the chain 
of command. This finding is supported by a study by the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies warning, “…that various military bureaucracies “unnecessarily 
overlap”, resulting in duplicative and, in some cases, overly large staffs that require 
wasteful coordination processes and impede necessary innovation” (Schmitt, 2004).   
Our research also found that almost every Secretary, Under Secretary, Assistant 
Secretary and high ranking military officer with a required signature anywhere in these 
three decision-making processes has their own group of analysts to recheck, re-verify and 
recertify the data provided them from others (all of which are in or near the Pentagon).  
An example with regard to aviation would be how the individual programs, system 
command Budget Financial Managers, the offices within N7, N8 (under the Chief of 
Naval Operations) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense all have cost-analysis 
experts on staff looking at the same data, yet coming up with different conclusions.  
Although risk reduction is important, it seems that DOD analysis capability has grown (in 
aggregate) past the point of diminishing returns.  
In our view the results of this research project call for efforts to reduce such 
redundancies through business process analysis and reengineering to eliminate 
duplication of effort, thereby increasing the quality of analysis provided to DOD decision 
makers, and to streamline decision making overall so that the time lapse between problem 
recognition and resolution is shortened (Hammer, 1990; Jones and Thompson, 1999: 47-
106). Reengineering requires a careful, step by step analysis of work processes to assess 
the value of work performed at each step, eliminating duplication of effort, unnecessary 
work and excessive procedural complexity. In addition we would like to see improved 
integration and more systematic communication within and between the PPBES and 
acquisition decision processes.  This in effect may be achieved only through improved 
alignment of the PPBES and DAS so that they work together rather than in tandem as 
separate systems. Realignment in essence required matching the two systems step by step 
in their analysis and decision stages to insure that timing and scheduling fit together so 
that mutual dependencies are addressed properly, with changes made when phases of 
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decision do not coordinate effectively. The overall goal of realignment is to match the 
processes of decision and to make the necessary changes in organizational structure to fit 
both the mission and the product demand functions necessary to meet market changes, 
e.g., changes in military mission and field asset requirements as is taking place presently 
in fighting the war on terrorism. When organizational mission forces changes in strategy 
and asset requirements, realignment typically is needed in complex organizations to 
match structure to strategy. This principle is well understood in the private sector but not 
so in government (Jones and Thompson, 1999: 127-178). In this regard, we would go so 
far to say that effective realignment of PPBES and the DAS may only be realized through 
merger of the two separate systems into a single decision process.  
As a step toward achieving better linkage of the type, we suggest is necessary without 
radical decision system redesign and realignment we support the creation of a new 
information system to record and communicate real-time, highly detailed, accurate and 
useful programmatic cost, schedule, and performance information to decision makers 
(Fierstine: 2004:110).  Included in this system should be highly detailed prioritization 
lists so that when decisions have to be made at subsequent levels of the budget an 
acquisition processes, those having to make decisions are better able to determine what 
should be implemented and what must be cut when necessary, and what should be bought 
when additional funding is available.  
We suggest that such a system would increase decision efficiency and shorten 
decision time since top leadership officials would be able to make decisions based on 
readily available data without having to “drill” back down into the military/service 
budget and program offices to get data to satisfy their needs. Our study indicates a need 
for simplifying the entire acquisition document-and-review process through business 
process reengineering of the type suggested by Jones and Thompson (1999). We find that 
current operators are reducing the risk of making the wrong decision by increasing the 
time to make the decision.  We also worry that currently there is no satisfactory way to 
address ideas or concerns that “bubble up” from the field that would add small increases 
in capability in the near-term.  Currently such decisions are divided between existing 
programs that require attention and emergent ideas that require immediate funding and 
could be fielded quickly and at low cost. An example of a less urgent nature includes F-
14 adaptation of the Air Force LANTERN pod.  This upgrade was on the USAF air 
community’s “top-ten upgrade list” for years, but was only able to secure funding after a 
monumental demonstration of innovation. Had the acquisition decision pipeline been able 
to rapidly and cost-effectively address this need, then neither warfighters nor DAS staff 
would have had to contend with the protracted process of test, evaluation and 
demonstration. Since changes such as this are relatively small and tend to be focused on 
the short term versus the JCIDS horizon of decades, warfighter operators typically are 
unable to enter the funding debate without great difficulty. We would argue that this issue 
appears small but in fact is important to field users. This example and our overall 
observations suggest that a better system needs to be established to allow adequate 
prioritization and swift communication of field level needs up the chain of command and 
into and through both the PPBES and DAS processes.  
We believe these ideas deserve further study. What may first be observed is that these 
recommendations call for reduction in staffs to eliminate redundancies, and also for the 
installation of a comprehensive real-time information system that would serve the same 
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information to all participants; additionally, we support the creation of a failure-analysis 
unit and system (Fierstine, 2004: 113). The risk here is that adding a new and complex 
information system and a new organizational entity to systems already rife with 
information systems and complexity is problematic. Additionally, the proposal to allow 
some systems to perform unique functions for specific military departments more quickly 
and in a more direct manner pushes against the joint and centralizing management trend 
currently in progress under transformation. Lastly, we are concerned about the risks 
inherent in implementing the changes we suggest that would be imposed on decision 
systems already undergoing substantial and continuous reform. Further changes will have 
to be made to systems that are already in the process of changing, and too much change at 
the same time is highly destabilizing to decision processes, especially during time of war, 
but we feel that this is a risk that must be taken.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our findings relative to our primary research hypothesis on weaknesses in integration of 
the PPBES and Defense Acquisition System decision cycles indicate there are numerous 
points at which substantial and reinforcing linkages exist, and others where the systems 
operate separately. The question is to what degree should parts that are not integrated 
presently be better integrated in the future? We conclude that significant business process 
reengineering and organizational realignment are needed to improve the overall 
integration and the consequent effectiveness of DOD resource management and 
acquisition. We believe that improved integration and more systematic communication 
within and between the PPBES and acquisition decision processes is necessary. This in 
effect may be achieved only through a long-term commitment to process reengineering 
and initiatives to improve alignment and linkage within and between the PPBES and 
DAS so that they work together rather than in tandem as separate systems (Thompson 
and Jones, 1994; Jones and Thompson, 1999). We conclude that effective realignment 
probably can be realized only through merger of the two separate systems into a single 
decision process. Short of such sweeping reform, we recommend that a new and better 
information system be created with the expressed purpose of providing data extracted 
from both systems to DOD decision makers in as close to real time as possible. We 
suggest that an enterprise data management approach would be most appropriate to 
implement this improvement effectively. However, we caution that the costs of enterprise 
system development and implementation must be controlled carefully through rigorous 
system design examination and close management control when systems are proposed 
and developed by contractors. Poor system design and weak, ineffective oversight control 
over development of new management information system design, along with ineffective 
contract management continue to be bugaboos that plague DOD. 
We find that the warfighting-needs definition system, the acquisition system (DAS), 
and the PPBE system focus on different tasks and their decision processes are not well 
integrated at many points -- from the assessment of the threat in the SPG to a design for 
joint capabilities in the JPG through the POM building process and into the annual budget 
preparation and review processes. Most, if not all, of the top leaders in the DOD hold 
multiple responsibilities in these systems. While formal processes intend to provide co-
ordination, much co-ordination only happens by forcing decisions on different aspects of 
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defense needs through the same sets of players – and by going around much of the 
procedural steps and complexity of the individual decision systems. Excessively 
complicated documentation and overly formal procedural requirements are required to be 
incorporated and adhered to before decisions can be made even initially -- and at 
subsequent important check points, be they intermediate milestones, POM formulation, 
or budget preparation and decision making stages. Typically, staffs of analysts in 
different organizational locales in and around the Pentagon often have duplicative 
responsibilities for data production, analysis and review in the great number of steps 
moving from program creation through decision, implementation, and execution.  
In addition to the complexity inherent in these systems, we conclude that the passage 
of time itself has important consequences for defense acquisition. Weapon systems take 
time to develop and build. The procurement effort can span multiple annual PPBE cycles, 
be under the influence of a series of layered PPBE decisions and feed data back into any 
number of current and future PPBE phases. The passage of time means that people, 
resources, and doctrine change. These are all threats to the orderly integration of 
warfighting requirements between the DAS and PPBES. 
Operators in the process express concern and frustrations with the outcomes produced 
by the DAS and PPBES. These range from process duplications, repetitious calculations 
of program costs by different staffs, inflated budget estimates for programs and concerns 
about the efficiency of the concurrent program- and budget-review processes. Additional 
research is underway to evaluate the validity of these concerns. We suggest that one way 
to improve the acquisition process is to change the budget process to a multi-year format. 
We believe this could reduce end-of-year turbulence and churn and allow for greater 
rationalization of DOD decision-making systems.  We reiterate that reengineering and 
realignment of the relationships between PPBES and the DAS is needed to achieve 
efficiency gains both within and between these systems. 
With respect to PPBES transformation, measures to improve decision integration 
appear to have been achieved under the leadership of Secretary Rumsfeld in combining 
the programming phase or "endgame" -- the last part of the programming phase -- with 
budget review. This is where the Senior Leadership Review Group established by the 
Secretary reviews, approves and sometimes is forced to cut major acquisition programs. 
For example, in 2004 and 2005, the Defense Secretary and the SLRG had to consider 
both significant increases in acquisition and reductions forced by the tight fiscal 
constraints of POM 07 and the FY 2006 defense budget. The SLRG review, forced by the 
need to reduce spending projections due to the costs of the global war on terrorism 
(GWOT) and other budgetary costs (including those for personnel and personnel 
entitlements programs), resulted in some major acquisition program shifts and reductions. 
These include approval of the Navy decision to retire an aircraft carrier early (the 
Kennedy), cancellation of the C-130J buy and reductions in the size of buys in 
submarines and surface vessels for the Navy, modularization for the Army (the 
acquisition portion of this initiative), and cuts in the Joint Strike Fighter and the F/A-22 
aircraft program for the Air Force.  
In budget execution, the problems we have identified in this paper will persist as far 
as we can ascertain, e.g., where budgets drive programs. Some of this is inevitable -- as a 
result of congressional politics that produce changes in defense budgets and acquisition 
programs beyond the ability of the DOD to resist. When such reordering of priorities 
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from outside of DOD occurs, it causes significant disruption in both programs and budget 
– especially in preparation of future budgets and in the execution of current 
appropriations. It also forces changes in both the structure and content of the POM and 
QDR, causing the programming process to have to move in reverse to accommodate 
budget changes in a way that almost always causes discontinuity and drives up costs in 
acquisition program management and execution. 
We conclude that under Secretary Rumsfeld a number of positive changes have been 
initiated to improve the manner in which the PPBES serves as a decision system for DOD 
to better integrate financial decisions with acquisition decision making. This is, in part, a 
result of Secretary Rumsfeld's demand for better information upon which to base 
decisions and his willingness to listen carefully and to question vigorously the data and 
options provided to him from his staff. In addition, it is a result of the changes made in 
the PPBES to better connect the process to the Secretary's procedural preferences. We 
also conclude that the acquisition system has been strengthened through program review 
in a number of ways including improvement in the role an performance of JCS staff (J8) 
where not just defense-wide acquisition programs (as was the case before 
transformation), but all DOD acquisition programs now are reviewed for jointness and 
feasibility. However, both the PPBES and DAS continue to reveal excessive procedural 
complexity that should be eliminated through reengineering, and the absence of sufficient 
integration that only may be addressed through realignment to better link these two 
systems.  
A key problem for both PPBES and acquisition is the relationship between 
programming and budgeting. This may be understood by pointing out differences in 
perspectives between staff working in different parts of the two decision systems. For 
example, DOD comptroller staff who have the chief responsibility for budgeting within 
PPBES contend that budgeting always integrates acquisition programming. However, 
military department/service, OSD level programmers and DAS program managers do not 
share this view, contending that too many budget decisions drive the POM, rather than 
the other way around as the system is supposed to operate. This may have changed to 
some extent over the past four years with programming and budget analysis and decision 
coupling, but there is insufficient evidence available about resolution of this problem to 
convince us that there is  demonstrable improvement in how DOD budgeting and 
acquisition systems operate with regard to integration and reduction of duplication of 
effort. What we have found is that DOD budgeting and acquisition systems have had to 
work harder to respond to changes in the threat and warfighting environment in the years 
since September 11, 2001 due to the demands of war. However, there is a difference 
between working harder and working smarter through the use of what may be termed a 
best practice approach. Our findings suggest strongly the need for reengineering and 
realignment of both the PPBES and acquisition decisions systems and linkages to reduce 
duplication of effort, to achieve better integration between systems, and to eliminate 
unnecessary procedural complexity in DOD resource decision making. 
The major challenge facing the DOD in the period 2005-2010 and beyond is how to 
continue to modernize the fighting forces and increase the pace of business 
transformation while paying a high price in waging a war on terrorism. In essence, what 
the DOD must fund and support in the short-term must be traded-off against longer-term 
investment intended to improve both business-management efficiency and force 
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readiness. Given this dilemma, it is clear that DOD leadership faces critical resource 
management challenges in the next decade. In this cost constrained environment it is 
essential for DOD to attempt to reengineer and realign separate budgeting/financial 
management and asset acquisition systems to improve integration of overall defense 
management decision making.  
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